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telephone service provider, call interception can be performed at the local switching station. As the details of network functioning are completely hidden from the user, it is impossible to detect the interception.
In the IP telephony, calls are carried over an IP-based packet-switched network. In a packet-switched network, there is no permanent path assigned to each user that would resemble the fixed route to the local switching station in the PSTN. Each data packet transmitted over the network may be routed to the destination over various routes that overlap only partially or not at all. Individual data packets representing fractions of media streams and signaling belonging to a single call may take different, unpredictable paths to the destination. In IP networks that supporI quality of service, the situation is somewhat different, but it is still impossible to locate and utilize a fixed access point for call interception. For each media stream, a fixed route with guaranteed quality of service is established using the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) 121. However, paths allocated for media streams in opposite directions may be different. During the call, path teardown and reestablishment over a different route may occur. The variable signaling path presents additional problems. Messages of various IP telephony signaling protocols [3] , [4] may take arbitrary, unpredictable routes, regardless of the fixed route allocated for the media stream.
Another difference between IP telephony and the PSTN is the user's insight into details of network functioning. By examining the functionality of the underlying network layer, an IP telephony user may be able to draw conclusions about the media and signaling path and detect the interception.
An important feature of IP telephony is the user mobility. Each user is identified by one or more alias addresses. The alias-addresses are usually in form of telephone numbers or textual names. The location service enables the user to be available by the alias address on various locations with different IP addresses. The wiretap service must be able to register users for surveillance both by alias addresses and by IP addresses. Calls conducted by users registered by their alias addresses must be intercepted, regardless of their current location and IP address. In explanation of this method, we assume that the network is comprised of a single zone. We also assume that direct call signaling is used between endpoints and that the Fast Connect or H.245 tunneling procedures are not used.
Under these premises, the call setup begins as shown in F i y r e 2. The caller sends an Admission Request (ARQ) message to the gatekeeper (I). The ARQ message body includes the alias address of the callee. The gatekeeper maintains the registration The wiretap device forwards all call signaling messages from each call participant to the other one (4-7, IO, 11). Thus, each endpoint sees a normal call setup, with another participant having the call signaling IP address ofthe wiretap device. The H.245 call control channels are opened in similar manner. One call control channel is opened between the caller and the wiretap device, and another between the wiretap device and the callee. The wiretap device forwards all call control messages from one call participant to another. Finally, each endpoint transmits its outgoing voice RTP stream to the wiretap machine, which forwards it to the other endpoint. As all signaling messages and the whole voice stream pass through the wiretap device, it is possible to record the entire call content to the local storage of the wiretap device. Though some assumptions were made in order to simplify the explanation of this method, this method can also be applied to other configurations, like gatekeeper-routed call setup and control signaling. In this case, the role of the wiretap device is simpler and includes only fonvarding of voice RTP streams. Gatekeeper is modified to record the necessaly signaling information that is routed through i t Calls using H.245 tunneling or Fast Connect methods can also be intercepted by this method. The difference lies only in number of established channels and forwarded messages. Similar method can be used in a network comprised of multiple zones, for intercepting calls between endpoints registered with different gatekeepers. Gatekeepers exchange information necessary for address translation via Location Request (LRQ) and Location Confirm (LCF) RAS messages. If the caller is designated for surveillance, the caller zone gatekeeper obtains the call signaling IP address of the callee via LRQ/LCF message exchange. The caller zone gatekeeper then sends the necessary information to the wiretap device of the caller zone. IP address of the wiretap device assigned to the caller zone is returned in the ACF message to the caller. If the callee is designated for surveillance, the callee zone gatekeeper performs call splitting by returning the IP address of the wiretap device assigned to the callee zone in the LCF message and informing the wiretap device of the incoming call.
As the gatekeeper simultaneously provides the address translation service and keeps the list of endpoints designated for surveillance, endpoints may be designated for surveillance by their alias addresses, IP addresses, or both.
The Wiretap Routing on Gatekeeper method does not require modification of any H.323 network components except the gatekeeper. The address translation service must be modified to selectively include the IP address of the wiretap machine into the ACF messages. The admissions control service must be modified to include a message exchange with the wiretap device before issuing the ACF message at each call initiation. The wiretap device is not complex and can be built using the same H.323 protocol stack implementation used for other network components.
If each user is only aware of alias addresses of other users, it is not possible to detect any distinguishable feature of the intercepted calls. From the point of view of both the caller and the callee, the only difference between normal and intercepted calls is the call signaling IP address of the other call participant. However, each user may be able to find out the IP address of the other call participant during the call. For example, the user may obtain it by directly asking the other call participant. By comparing this I P address to the IP address of the device to which the connections and logical channels ofthe current call are established, the user is able to determine if the call is being intercepted.
Another problem of this method is the degradation of the quality of service. The message exchange during the setup of intercepted calls is significantly more complex, and the call setup takes a longer time to complete. Routing of voice streams through the wiretap machine may significantly prolong the route that the RTP packets carrying voice take from one endpoint to another. This leads to increased packet loss, jitter, and especially transport latency.
The major advantage of this method is that it enables reliable interception of all calls in a gatekeeper operated H.323 network. However, call interception by this method is prone to detection by an expert user and therefore does not comply with all legal requirements.
Iv. FIXED ROUTE WIRETAP
Call interception by Wiretap Routing on the Gatekeeper selectively splits calls conducted by endpoints designated for surveillance in order to establish a fixed point of routing. However, call splitting can be detected by users and sewes as an indication that the call is being intercepted. A possible solution to the detection problem is splitting all calls in the H.323 network and selectively recording those conducted by parties designated for surveillance. The wiretap device, similar to that used for Wiretap Routing on the Gatekeeper, is added as a logically separate component io the H.323 network. This method uses the same call splitting technique as the Wiretap Routing on the Gatekeeper. However, the gatekeeper does not examine the Admission Request messages initiating each call to determine if the call should be rerouted. Instead, the call routing through the wiretap device is applied io all calls. Every call that occurs in the H.323 network is routed by the gatekeeper to the wiretap device. The wiretap device splits each call into two calls -one between the caller and the wiretap device, and another between the wiretap device and the callee. Call setup procedure is similar to that shown in Figure 3 . The message sent from the gatekeeper to the wiretap device at the start of each call includes not only the addresses of call participants, but also a flag that indicates whether the call content should be recorded. This is necessary because the wiretap device is not supposed to intercept all calls that are routed through it.
In order to use this method, it is necessary to add the wiretap device as a new logical device to the H.323 network. It is also necessary to introduce the gatekeeper modifications similar to those described in Section 111.
Call interception system based on this method complies with all legal requirements. It enables interception of all calls conducted by any endpoint in the network, and the call interception is not prone to detection.
A significant problem of this method is the load imposed on the wiretap device. The wiretap device must be able to route both the signaling messages and the RTP voice streams of all calls that occur in the entire H.323 network. This raises the problem of scalability, which can be solved by implementing the wiretap device as a distributed system of separate physical devices. For this purpose, a special information exchange protocol must be developed to supply gatekeepers with information necessary to determine the proper device for routing each individual call.
Another problem is the degradation of quality of sewice, similar to that described in Section 111. This degradation affects all calls in the IP telephony network in which a call interception system based on this method is implemented.
V. PROMISCUOUS WIRETAP
Methods for call interception described in Sections 11-IV are based on modifying the H.323 network components that operate at the application layer, or introducing new ones. An alternative approach is to implement a device that operates in prontiscuous mode and monitors the entire network traffic. The device extracts media streams and signaling messages transmitted or received by parties under surveillance.
The Promiscuous Wiretap Device is connected to the local area network switch or hub. The switch must be configured to forward the entire data traffic from all ports to the monitoring port to which the wiretap device is connected. The wiretap device implements the H.323 protocol stack and is able to extract H.225 call signaling and H.245 control signtaling messages, as well as RTP voice streams from the received data. By extracting the call signaling and control messages, the wiretap device recognizes the setup and termination of each call. By extracting the RTP packets transmitted by the endpoints during the call, the wiretap device assembles the voice content of the call. Therefore, the wiretap device is able to maintain call record with the entire signaling and voice contents of each call taking place on the H.323 network. The wiretap device can be implemented in hardware or in software, on a general-pulpose computer with network card configured to work in promiscuous mode. The wiretap device must maintain a list of endpoints designated for surveillance and match the endpoint information extracted from signaling messages of each call with entries from that list. From the call signaling, it is possible to extract the IP addresses of both call participants and the alias addresses of the caller. Alias addresses of the callee cannot be extracted from the call signaling. Therefore, the list of endpoints designated for surveillance must contain their IP addresses. It is necessary to implement an additional network component that has access to the address translation service and supplies the wiretap device with this information.
One possible solution is to modify the gatekeeper to maintain a list of endpoints designated for surveillance and send periodic messages that contain lists of their IP addresses to the wiretap device.
Call interception by the Promiscuous Wiretap Device does not alter either the paths or the contents of voice and signaling in intercepted calls. Therefore, it is not possible for the parties under surveillance to detect the call interception. This method does not affect the quality of service.
The Promiscuous Wiretap Device enables interception of all calls in the H.323 network, within limits imposed by performance of the network switch and processing power of the wiretap device. A significant problem is the ability of the wiretap device to monitor the entire traffic in high-speed networks. For example, if the wiretap device is implemented in software on a contemporary personal computer, it is not possible to effectively monitor the traffic in a 100Mbk LAN. The performance of the network switch can also present a problem. At high levels of network load, it may be impossible for the switch to forward the entire traffic to a single port.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described four methods for call interception in H.323-based IP telephony nctworks. Wiretap on Gateways enables undetectable interception of all calls that utilize internetworking between H.323 network and the PSTN, but does not enable interception of calls taking place within the H.323 network. Wiretap Routing on the Gatekeeper enables interception of all calls in the H.323 network, but degrades quality of service for intercepted calls and can be detected by an expert user. Fixed Route Wiretap enables undetectable interception of all calls in the H.323 network. However, it degrades quality of service for all calls in the H.323 network and raises scalability problems. Promiscuous Wiretap enables undetectable call interccption, but only within limits imposed by performance of the wiretap device and the network switch, which may be problematic a1 high levels of network load.
Future work will include implementing a call interception system based on methods described in this paper and performance measurements.
